Climate Change and Industrial Policy by Naude, Wim
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2011 
*Maastricht School of Management, email: naude@msm.nl 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on Promoting Entrepreneurial Capacity, 
directed by Wim Naudé.  
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions to the project by the Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, and the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of 
Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United Kingdom (Department for 
International Development). 
ISSN 1798-7237   ISBN 978-92-9230-444-7 
Working Paper No. 2011/77 
 







This paper explores the implications of climate change for industrial policy (IP). Five 
implications are discussed, namely the need for international coordination of IPs; for 
putting human development, and not emission targets, as the overriding objective of 
low-carbon IP; of stimulating innovation for energy efficiency, energy diversification, 
and carbon capture and storage; and for aligning IP with trade policies. Finally the 
funding needs of low-carbon IPs are discussed, and the importance of private sector 
funding emphasized.  
Keywords: climate change, sustainable development, industrialization, industrial 
policy, low-carbon growth 
JEL classification: L60, O25, Q54, Q55,  
    
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Lisa Winkler at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgements 
This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper published in 2011 in Sustainability, 3 
(7): 1003–21. 
 








   1
1 Introduction 
Industrial Policy (IP) is vital for sustainability in its broadest sense: both environmental 
as well as societal sustainability will depend on IP. In a world characterized by growing 
inter- and intra-country inequality, industrialization offers scope for providing job 
opportunities, incomes, and the chance for industrially lagging countries (ILCs) to catch 
up. In a world facing the specter of climate change, low-carbon industrialization, and 
green growth paths have become imperatives. Altenburg (2009) describes climate 
change as one of the most important challenges facing IP. Naudé and Alcorta (2010) 
stress that achieving low-carbon industrialization  
… is going to require selective government intervention … neutrality 
towards all products and processes cannot be maintained. It has got to be 
driven by governments as coordination, subsidization, protection, 
information and large scale investments are at the core of the responses 
towards limiting the human impact on climate change. The need for 
making the right choices will become even more apparent as the world’s 
population increases to more than 9 billion people by 2050. A growing 
population with increasing purchasing power will demand new and more 
products and ways of making them that will not only have a heavy toll on 
the environment but will also put heavy pressure on the availability of 
natural resources to produce them (ibid.: 1) 
Moreover, promoting low-carbon industrialization and obtaining its accompanying 
development benefits (Szirmai 2009) will itself improve the ability of currently poor 
countries to adapt to climate change. It is the case that ‘the best defence against climate 
change is economic development’ (Schelling 2009: 16). 
Although the Earth’s climate has always been changing there is now wide agreement 
that the climate is warming and that human emission of greenhouse gases1 (GHGs)—
anthropogenic global warming (AGW)—is a contributing factor. ‘Every company, 
every farm, every household emits some greenhouse gases’ (Tol 2010: 29). One of the 
most significant levels stems from industrial activity. Industry demands around 30 per 
cent of global final energy demand and is responsible for around 40 per cent of all 
energy-related emissions, with iron and steel, cement, chemicals and petrochemicals, 
pulp and paper, and aluminum production being the most carbon intensive (IEA 2009b). 
The human-emitted component of GHGs in the atmosphere has risen considerably since 
the first Industrial Revolution. It poses a challenge for human well-being as warmer 
climate is expected to have many negative (although also positive) impacts on society.  
When the current industrially advanced countries underwent their rapid industrialization 
process starting in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and even when China started 
its economic reform in 1978, the potential threat of climate change, and in particular by 
AGW, was unknown. Over the past two decades, however, it has become one of the 
most talked about global challenges of our times.  
                                                 
1  Including carbon dioxide, CO2, and methane, CH4.   2
Climate change is predicted to have particular economic and social impacts through 
various channels; moreover these are expected to differ geographically, and as the next 
section will detail, developing countries are expected to be worst affected. These 
impacts and consequences will require adaptation to climate change as well as actions 
to mitigate AGW. It means that active and selective IP will have to be used by both 
advanced as well as developing countries to achieve the balancing act of reducing GHG 
emissions and ensuring that industry (manufacturing in particular) remains an engine of 
growth and employment. 
Adaptation and mitigation will have costs and opportunities for industrial development, 
but differing across the globe. Generally, the challenge is to ensure that industrial 
development and the prospects for industrial development is not adversely affected by 
climate change and that industrial development takes place without worsening AGW—
ideally contributing towards moving global production, distribution, and consumption 
towards a low-carbon and eventually decarbonized economy. Moreover 
industrialization itself could mitigate climate change and facilitate adaptation through 
providing the means to accelerate the transfer of employment from agriculture to 
industry—this could potentially reduce pressures on deforestation and clearing of land 
for agriculture, two important sources of GHG emissions.2  
The purpose of this paper is to further explore the need or rationale for IP due to climate 
change, and to determine what it implies for the how of IP. To achieve these objectives 
the remainder of the paper will discuss the challenges facing both industrialized and 
ILCs in contributing towards a low-carbon economy. The central argument of the paper 
is that a low-carbon economy will require mitigation, explicit recognition of the 
relationship between adaptation and industrialization, and should be undergirded by 
international coordination. For the how  of IP it requires at a minimum a threefold 
approach, consisting of (i) appropriate innovation and technological change, (ii) trade 
policy alignment, and (iii) the prioritization of sustainable human development.  
Before discussing the elements of this threefold approach, the basics of climate change 
economics as it pertains to industrialization and IP is discussed in Section 2. This is to 
provide an adequate frame of reference and stress the daunting obstacles in the path of 
low-carbon industrialization. Then in Sections 3 the three implications for the how of IP 
(innovation, trade, and sustainable human development) with respect to mitigation and 
adaption and industrialization are discussed. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Climate  change  and  industrialization 
2.1  Greenhouse gas emissions and industrialization  
Before proceeding it may be necessary to deal briefly with the question: how does 
AGW occur? The answer, as alluded to in the introduction is that human activity give 
rise to GHGs (especially carbon dioxide, CO2, and methane, CH4). The so-called Kaya 
Identity (see Girod et al. 2009) is used to depict the main links between human activity 
and GHG emission: 
                                                 
2  According to estimates deforestation in developing countries is currently the source of up to 25 per 
cent of all GHG emissions (Martin 2010).   3
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The Kaya identity shows that GHG emissions arise from human activity through 
increases in incomes, and energy and carbon intensity, all which rise with population 
growth. Industrialization therefore contribute towards GHG emissions through (i) 
contributing to general GDP growth, (ii) having a dramatic overall impact on energy 
demand and use, and (iii) using carbon-intense production methods. 
Based on the Kaya identity, given forecasts of economic development, population 
growth, and given assumptions on energy demand and carbon intensity of production 
and consumption, it is possible to predict GHG emissions caused by human activity. 
Such predictions are provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)3 and the International Energy Agency (IEA). According to the IEA’s recent 
estimates, CO2 emissions are currently increasing by about 1.5 per cent annually. As a 
result it predicts emissions to rise from 28.8 Gt (gigaton) in 2007 to 40.2 Gt by 2030 
(IEA 2009a). Faster industrialization in the developing world will, ceteris paribus, raise 
these emissions and contribute to further AGW. 
2.2  Economic impacts of global warming 
What are the consequences of global warming, and hence the consequences of 
industrialization? The overall assessment is that global warming will be detrimental to 
economic development and contribute to greater poverty (Ojha 2008). Various studies, 
using quantitative modelling techniques including computable general equilibrium 
models, have since the early 1990s been used to estimate the economic impact of global 
warming. Most studies have assumed an increase in global mean temperature of either 1 
⁰C or 2.5 ⁰C—which is assumed would occur if the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere 
doubles. Table 1, adapted from Tol (2010), summarizes the key peer reviewed studies in 
this regard. 
Table 1 indicates that most peer reviewed estimates of the economic impacts of climate 
change ranges between -11.4 and 2.3 per cent of global GDP. It can also been seen that 
some regions are net losers—in many cases Africa or Asia—and some net winners—
mostly Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
One of the quoted (and criticized) estimates on the impacts and costs of climate change 
and its mitigation comes from the Stern Review (Stern 2006). The Stern Review 
estimated that climate change’s economic damages would amount to around 12 per cent 
of global GDP, and that the costs of mitigation—moving to a low-carbon economy—
would be much lower, around 1 per cent of global GDP. Hence the key message of the 
Stern Review was that the impact of climate change is likely to be severe but the costs 
of avoiding this relatively small, if the world acts without delay.  
                                                 
3  For a discussion of the criticisms against the IPCC’s scenarios see Girod et al. (2009).   4
Key criticisms against the Stern Review were that too low a discount rate was used to 
value future damages, thereby overstating future damages, and that mitigation costs 
were underestimated (see e.g. Tol and Yohe 2006; Nordhaus 2007).  
The World Bank’s 2010 World Development Report (WDR) focused on climate 
change. According to the World Bank (2010) global climate change will have 
disproportionate negative impact on developing countries, in particular on agricultural 
productivity in Africa, South Asia, and parts of Latin America. The World Bank also 
expects that Russia and Canada and parts of Western Europe may benefit through 
improving agricultural productivity. The potential out-migration of people from 
agriculture in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America has accordingly been raised as a 
concern (Martin 2010), and emphasizes the importance for structural change—
industrialization—to assist in providing alternative employment to out-migrants from 
agriculture.  
Predicting the economic impacts of global warming is however, a contentious issue—as 
is the case generally with climate modelling or weather forecasting—with Prins et al. 
(2010: 18) complaining that assumptions and simplifications used in such models can 
‘undergird just about any view of the future that one prefers’, and Tol (2010: 30) stating 
that ‘the uncertainties about climate change are vast indeed, so vast that the standard 
tools of decision-making under uncertainty and learning may not be applicable’. He 
provides a discussion of some of the methodological challenges in estimating the 
economic impacts of climate change such as (i) the difficulty of assigning uncertainties 
(i.e. discount rates), (ii) the difficulty of modelling adaptation, of (iii) putting values on 
environmental services, and of (iv) estimating the marginal costs of GHG emissions. 
Given the acknowledgement that, despite uncertainties in estimating the impact of 
climate change, it remains a significant threat and that reducing GHG emissions are 
warranted, economists have asked what the social costs of GHG emissions are, with a 
view of establishing a price on carbon (through taxes, emission trading, or regulation). 
This is based on the economic view that the cost of a negative externality, such as a 
carbon emission, need to be internalized by the party responsible.  
Tol (2010: 41) considered estimates from 232 published scientific studies and 
concluded that ‘the uncertainty about the social costs of climate change is very large’. 
The mean estimate from these studies is US$105 per ton of carbon, with the modal 
estimate around US$13 per ton and the median US$29 per ton.  
Industrialization, given its high contribution to emissions, thus clearly carries a price. 
Although the extent of the ultimate price is still subject to uncertainty, what is certain is 
that poorer countries will be worst affected, and that unless industrialization can 
proceed in a way that reduces GHG emissions, the eventual price will be higher, both in 
terms of damages to GDP and the social costs of emissions. Indeed, as the IEA (2009b: 
21) notes ‘total industrial energy consumption and CO2 emissions are rising and 
progress in industrial efficiency and CO2 intensity has been more than offset by growing 
industrial production’. 
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3  Implications for industrial policy  
Achieving low-carbon industrialization has a number of interrelated implications for IP. 
These will be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
3.1  International coordination of industrial policy 
A piecemeal, country-by-country approach is likely to be sub-optimal. In the past IP 
was very much nationally-oriented with little cooperation and coordination between 
countries. Now however, a transition to a low-carbon economy will require global 
cooperation and coordination. This raises issues of the appropriate and effective 
institutional mechanisms to achieve such coordination. Is it through the UN, the G20, 
regional initiatives like the EU, or perhaps some other sovereign, non-state actor? And 
how will compliance be ensured and monitored? Before coming to these issues, the case 
for international coordination of IPs needs to be stressed. 
It has been estimated that in order to limit average global warming to 2 ⁰C by 2100, 
with a 50 per cent probability, that concentrations of CO2 should be stabilized at 450 
ppm (parts per million) by 2030 (IEA 2009a)—it is at the time of writing (2010) around 
389 ppm and rising by 2 ppm per year—growing at around 1.5 per cent annually (Prins 
et al. 2010; IEA 2009a).  
The challenge in achieving this reduction in CO2 seems almost too incredible to 
achieve. Barrett (2009) reports that CO2 should be reduced not to 450 ppm but to 350 
ppm to limit global warming—a level already exceeded. He refers to the need therefore 
for a ‘global climate-technology revolution’ to aim at this target, while the IEA (2009a: 
8) calls for a ‘low-carbon revolution’. Nothing less than a low-carbon ‘revolution’ is 
called for, as the IEA (2009a) expects that at current rates, CO2 emissions would 
continue to rise from 28.8 Gt (gigatonnes) in 2007 to 40.2 Gt in 2030. This is estimated 
to push average global temperatures up by 6 ⁰C and result in CO2 levels of more than 
1,000 ppm.  
Currently, and to date since the first industrial revolution, most developing countries are 
not major GHG emitters—even large emerging economies like China, Brazil, and India 
emit relatively little in per capita terms—although due to the size of their populations 
and economies their total emissions are significant (Ojha 2008). However as far as the 
future is concerned, the IEA (2009a) expects that all of the projected increase in CO2 
emissions between now and 2030 will come from developing countries—mainly China, 
India, and the Middle East. Around 75 per cent of the predicted 12 Gt increase in annual 
emissions is set to come from China alone, with the country expected to become the 
world’s largest importer of oil by 2025 (IEA 2009a). The growth in CO2 will be driven 
not only by the growing prosperity and rising demand from rising industrial giants such 
as China and India, but also from the need to meet the, still as yet unmet, demand of 
around 1.5 billion people around the world who lack access to electricity. The majority 
of these live in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (IEA 2009a).  
Developing countries will, however, in many cases also be the worst affected by climate 
change, as was discussed in Section 2. And most of the current industrially-generated 
stock of carbon in the atmosphere has been caused by advanced economies, where most 
of the technological capability, know-how, human skills, and financial resources reside 
to mitigate climate change and adapt to its impacts.    6
This suggests that a low-carbon revolution requires global coordination. Many questions 
have arisen and remain relevant. How can this do be accomplished? Is it possible? What 
will be the costs? Is globally coordinated action towards a low-carbon economy 
possible? There are currently no clear answers. What is clear at the time of writing is 
that the multilateral (UN-mediated) negotiations route, which has characterized global 
coordination attempts for almost two decades, has not yet resulted in definitive success. 
The process, which started with the Rio Declaration and includes the flawed Kyoto 
Protocol, has not been a total failure as some would suggest. There have been in fact 
hugely important milestones—but they have not yet brought the world significantly 
closer towards containing global warming.  
The ‘Hartwell Paper’ (see Prins et al. 2010) is particularly critical of the multilateral 
UN-mediated route to achieve a reduction in CO2 emissions, claiming that it is putting 
carbon reductions before human development, that it is being overly top-down in its 
approach of working through ‘set-piece conferences’, and that it obscures varying 
‘interests and agendas within utopian talk of global and universal solutions’ (ibid.: 12). 
What bedevils global coordination with respect to achieving a low-carbon economy are 
a number of conflicting incentives arising out of the nature of the climate change 
challenge. The first is that developing countries have potentially much to gain from 
carbon-intensive industrialization. This issue will be discussed in greater depth in the 
next section, as it has a bearing on the objectives of IP. 
The second problem is that climate change and the move to a low-carbon economy 
creates both potential losers and winners—it has unequal benefits and costs so that 
countries face an incentive structure that ‘resembles a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma 
game’ (Brandt and Svendsen 2003: 10). These create potential benefits for countries 
with low-carbon technologies and/or the knowledge to be a producer and exporter of 
such technologies—indeed they could corner the market. In other words a first-mover 
advantage in low-carbon technology and products could be valuable. How should 
countries with such an advantage exploit it? The answer is through IPs that ensure that a 
sufficiently large number of countries would want to adopt such technologies—for 
instance through committing to binding agreements on CO2 reductions and increasing 
the share of non-renewable energy. Such a country-level strategy could, however, be 
counter-productive from the point of view of obtaining binding agreements on CO2 
reductions if there are countries who do not want, for competitiveness reasons, to allow 
others to exploit their first-mover advantage.  
This is according to Brandt and Svendsen (2003) exactly, however, the position the EU 
and USA find themselves in, and that could explain part of the USA’s reluctance to 
commit to the Kyoto Protocol. Their thesis is that the EU has a first-mover advantage in 
some renewable energy technologies, for instance windmills,4 and is therefore quite 
keen to push for wide international agreements that will see a rise in the price of carbon 
                                                 
4  Brandt and Svendsen (2003) discuss the case of Denmark, where government subsidization of the 
wind turbine industry (following the oil crisis of 1973) has resulted in the country gaining a lead in the 
production of windmills.   7
and targeted share of renewable energies in future energy consumption.5 See also Helm 
(2009) who states that the EU is projecting a leadership role for itself in setting GHG 
emissions targets. However, for countries without this advantage, such agreements will 
result in them having to spend more on importing such renewable energy technologies 
from the EU. Brandt and Svendsen (2003) argue that this may be a reason why countries 
such as the USA have been reluctant to commit to such globally-binding agreements, 
and may perhaps also explain why the EU’s climate policy over the past two decades 
has ‘probably not made as much as one part per million difference … the rhetoric, the 
plethora of initiatives, directives, and interventions has not been matched by outcomes’ 
(Helm 2009: 1). 
International coordination of IP is thus needed for low-carbon industrialization, but 
faces daunting challenges in dealing with strategic and opportunistic national behaviour. 
3.2  Objectives of low-carbon industrial policy 
A second implication of the need for low-carbon industrialization for IP is for the 
fundamental objective of a low-carbon IP and the cooperation and coordination to 
underpin it. Should it be first and foremost (as has been the case in current global 
climate negotiations) be on carbon reduction, or on human development (as growing 
numbers of commentators have been arguing)?  
However such coordination is done, it might mean that industrial policies will face 
certain (more) international constraints (policy space for supporting carbon-intensive 
manufactured goods may for instance increasingly shrink), but will have to balance 
global pressures for climate change mitigation against national pressures for job 
creation and infrastructure. 
In Section 3.1 the difficulty of reaching a substantial international agreement on climate 
change was discussed. There was noted that many developing countries have potentially 
much to gain from carbon-intensive industrialization, particularly as they face for job 
creation and provision of basic services, including electricity.  
The IEA (2009a) estimates that more than 1.5 billion people worldwide lack access to 
electricity. High unemployment is critical in emerging regions such as Africa and Latin 
America, and industrial development remains one of the engines of job creation. As put 
by Ojha (2008: 324) for most developing countries ‘the more pressing need obviously is 
achieving poverty reduction rather than controlling carbon emissions’. This should be 
seen against the fact that coal is still one of the most abundant, and cheapest, sources of 
energy in developing countries. For instance, in India it accounted for over 47 per cent 
of energy demand in 2005 (Ojha 2008). And South Africa started the construction of a 
huge coal-fired power station only months after it became a party to the Copenhagen 
Accord of December 2009 (which is, however, not legally binding).  
It is not that these countries are not concerned with the impacts of climate change. 
Rather it is a question of addressing the challenge without compromising on 
                                                 
5  The EU’s 20-20-20 Climate Change Package adopted in January 2008 aims to reduce EU emissions to 
20 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 and raise the proportion of energy from renewable to 20 per 
cent by 2020 (Helm 2009).   8
development and rising living standards. And the latter is likely to win in any ‘contest’. 
As recognized by Helm (2009: 6) 
The key challenge for climate-change policy is how the developing 
world can raise its standards of living towards those of the developed 
countries and at the same time global carbon emissions, and other 
environmental damage, can be reduced.   
With this in mind many have criticized the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) multilateral-type of approach of putting carbon reductions 
ahead of people’s development, and see the failure of COP15 at Copenhagen in 
December 2009 as a result of this misplaced emphasis. As was put forcefully by the 
Hartwell Paper  
Climate change is better understood as a persistent condition that must be 
coped with and can only be partially managed more-or-less well … it is 
not straightforwardly an environmental problem either. It is 
axiomatically as much an energy problem, or a land-use problem, and 
may be better approached through these avenues than as a problem of 
managing the behaviour of the Earth’s climate (Prins et al. 2010: 16). 
Similarly, Bondre (2010: 16) saw the failure of the COP15 meeting as due to the 
singular focus on GHG reduction, stating that climate change is a ‘multipronged 
challenged’ and should not just have ‘a singular focus on global warming’ as it would 
drive polarization. Tol (2010, 2002a, 2002b) and others have argued that, because 
poverty is a fundamental cause of climate change, that the best strategy is to speed up 
economic growth and development—it is seen in these quarters as even better than 
emissions reduction. Also, has been argued that developed countries may find it 
‘cheaper to compensate poorer countries for the climate change damages caused, rather 
than to pay for reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions’ (Tol 2010: 36).  
Some have also asked about the effectiveness of advanced regions, such as the EU, 
trying to adopt expensive measures to reduce their GHG emissions. According to Helm 
(2009:6) ‘… there may be much cheaper ways, for example by preserving tropical 
rainforests or decarbonizing China and India’s rapid coal-based economic growth’.  
The implication is that once the objective of low-carbon IP is to promote sustainable 
human development, issues such as these raised above become important, and start to 
shift to centre stage in the debate, resulting in not only different approaches to IP (more 
internationally coordinated), but also containing different IP content (such as 
compensation and transfers from advanced to emerging countries). 
3.3  Innovation-driven industrial policy 
Achievement of a low-carbon revolution is clearly impossible without innovation and 
technological change. Innovation is a complex process, and requires a systems 
approach—as is seen on a country-basis in governments’ efforts to enhance their 
national systems of innovation and on an international level by the promoting of 
Research, Development, and Demonstration (RD&D) by the UNFCCC, the Major   9
Economies Forum (MEF)6 and IEA. It is also a process wherein entrepreneurship plays 
a leading role. Entrepreneurship is vital for innovation (Schumpeter 1911) and 
entrepreneurial innovation has played already an important role in reducing CO2 
emissions. The Soviet Union and Maoist China are examples of large economies that 
had little prospect of declining emissions—indeed these countries saw very rapid CO2 
emissions characterizing their industrialization during the twentieth century.  
Innovation can be a gradual progress, and as far as low-carbon IPs are concerned, this 
will have to be taken into consideration. It poses, however, difficult questions in terms 
of capital investments and returns on these. For instance, as discussed by Prins et al. 
(2010), moving to a low-carbon economy will require IP measures towards innovation 
and technological change that have different outcomes over the short, medium, and long 
term. Over the short term the emphasis needs to be on improving energy efficiency, 
over the medium term to phase in the greater use of renewable energy and energy 
diversification, and over the longer term to introduce more path-breaking technologies 
for low-carbon production. The remainder of this sub-section discusses energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, and energy diversification, and low-carbon production 
technologies. 
3.3.1 Energy  efficiency 
Energy efficiency entails using less energy in production and consumption. Examples 
include development of ‘smart grids’, improvements in building energy efficiency, 
industrial energy efficiency and vehicle efficiency, including the promotion of 
electric/hybrid, and hydrogen based vehicles (IEA, 2009b). Energy efficiency in 
industrial process can contribute significantly to reduced GHG emissions—Trudeau and 
Tam (2009) estimate that energy savings in the industry could contribute to a reduction 
of up to 5.7 Gt in CO2 emissions by 2050. Globally coordinated IP and cooperation in 
IP is required since developing countries can reduce their industrial emissions 
significantly over the short to medium term through adoption of currently existing best 
available technologies (BAT). Prins et al. (2010) for instance report that BAT in the 
steel industry is globally diffused; it would reduce CO2 emissions annually by around 
340 million tons. Similarly significant reductions may be obtained if coal-powered 
plants would adopt best available practice (IEA 2009). IPs facilitating learning, copying, 
adopting, and experimentation on a sector by sector basis (the nature, needs, and 
requirements for improving energy efficiency differs substantially between industrial 
sectors) will be needed (Trudeau and Tam 2009). 
It should be noted that though improvement in industrial energy efficiency can make an 
important short-term contribution, it may not necessarily lead to significantly lower 
energy demand or reduced GHG emissions. This is because of the income—effect of 
energy savings—people may channel their energy savings into increased consumption 
on other, more carbon-intensive goods. This means that carbon taxes may be needed as 
an IP measure to facilitate longer terms reductions in GHGs from energy efficiency 
(Helm 2009). And industries may expand faster than the savings they establish.  
 
                                                 
6  An objective of the MEF is to double expenditures on RD&D for low carbon technologies by 2015 
(IEA 2009b).   10
3.3.2 Energy  diversification 
Energy diversification requires clear IP initiatives to increase the share of non-fossil 
fuels in energy demand. Energy diversification would mean greater use of nuclear and 
renewable energy sources—clean energy. Such diversification is enjoying high priority 
in many countries, not just based on concerns about climate change, but also about 
energy security and the possible opportunities it may hold for industrialization and job 
creation. For instance, in the latter regard the South African government estimates that 
300,000 new jobs could be created in the country through renewable energy production 
over a period of ten years. The country’s Industrial Development Corporation envisages 
a US$10 billion investment in renewable energies between 2010 and 2015 (Creamer 
2010). Diversifications of energy towards renewable and nuclear sources are therefore 
set to continue for these reasons. 
The main sources7 of renewable energy include wind, solar, bio-energy, geothermal, 
and wave (marine) energy, although at present most RD&D into renewable energy are 
going into solar power (see Table 2). Marine and hydroelectricity is relatively neglected, 
also in the IEA (2009b) reports on renewable energy initiatives.  
According to Barrett (2009) the main task is to reduce the relative cost of these 
sources—currently they are much more expensive than carbon sources of energy and 
thus uneconomical. He points out that lowering their costs will involve not only 
technological innovation in the energy generation process itself, but also in 
complementary technologies in the transmission and storage—especially of wind and 
solar energy, where the resource is often located at some distance from where the 
energy is demanded. It will also require a high and rising price of carbon. Carbon can be 
priced through putting a tax on it or using a market-based mechanism such as a permits 
or trading scheme. A large literature has arisen discussion about the pros and cons of 
various ways of pricing carbon. Many argued that taxes are better than permits or 
trading schemes (e.g. Nordhaus 2009; Helm 2009).  
The major trading schemes that have so far been created for pricing carbon include the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the north eastern USA and the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Carbon pricing mechanisms, in particular cap and 
trade proposals and carbon taxes have generated substantial criticism. (Prins et al. 2010: 
9).claim that 
The huge efforts that have been invested in elaborating complex top-
down regulatory regimes and in particular the ambitions for regional—let 
alone global—cap and trade regimes to regulate carbon by price can now 
be seen to have been barren in their stated aims although profitable for 
some in unexpected and unwelcome ways.  
There have also been concerns that energy demand is highly inelastic so that a higher 
price for carbon will have little impact—apart from hurting the poor. 
                                                 
7  Nuclear power is not a renewable source of energy because it is dependent on uranium supplies. 
However, it can provide substantial non-carbon energy over the medium term, subject to risks (Barrett 
2009).   11
Other criticisms concern the difficulties in establishing a price for carbon (see Helm 
2009), reflected in the fact that governments have so far been unsuccessful in 
cooperating to increase the price of carbon (Barrett 2009). Indeed many have pointed to 
the volatility of carbon prices in the ETS as creating uncertainty. Helm (2009) provides 
extensive criticism against the EU’s ETS, arguing that it is has been a failure due to 
political compromises and lobbying by polluters—a typically old problem of any IP. As 
he describes, ‘a tradable permits regime creates new markets, which in turn create rents 
for participants. There is now a rapidly growing set of vested financial interests with 
every incentive to lobby for the retention and development of the EU ETS’ (ibid.: 9). 
The challenge for low-carbon IPs is how the incentive problem for getting 
entrepreneurial investment into developing and rolling out low-carbon technologies can 
be successfully overcome. Fundamentally, there may be substantial entrepreneurial 
opportunities in low-carbon industrialization for developing countries. Many are already 
looking at China’s example to provide the lead, and create further incentives and 
opportunities for ILCs to use low-carbon technologies as a way to catch up—similar to 
the way that it provided opportunities for catching up in conventional manufacturing. 
China, the world’s largest energy consumer, is already a world leader in wind power 
and solar energy, and is making strides in expanding nuclear energy generation. 
3.3.3  Carbon capture, storage, and sequestration 
Over the longer term more path-breaking technologies for low-carbon production and 
energy diversification are needed. How can IP promote these? One answer is that IP 
should invest in mechanisms for directly removing, storing, and sequestering carbon 
from the atmosphere (Barrett 2009). As put by Helm (2009:21) ‘unless coal can be 
burnt in a less harmful way … there will be little or no progress in abating global 
emissions’. Such carbon capture and storage (CCS) mechanisms are currently 
expensive, ranging from US$25 per ton of CO2 to US$90 per ton of CO2 (Barrett 2009). 
Stimulating further investment in these will also require, as in the case of energy 
efficiency measures, that a positive and increasing price of carbon be established to 
underpin IP for a low-carbon economy. 
But carbon pricing will in itself not be sufficient to stimulate investment in CSS. In 
addition, subsidies to low-carbon technologies and goods will be required (greater 
spending on research, development and dissemination—RD&D), as well as IP measures 
to reduce carbon leakage.  
Consider RD&D: IEA (2009b) provides a discussion of current RD&D expenditures of 
mainly OECD countries and the aims of these expenditures across ten categories of 
RD&D in low-carbon technologies8. These expenditures are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 indicates that, based on available data, by far the most significant bulk of 
RD&D expenditures to promote low-carbon economy takes place in the area of 
                                                 
8   There are a number of efforts to globally coordinate RD&D efforts. These include initiatives by the 
MEF, the UFCCC, and the IEA The MEF aims to double expenditures on RD&D for low carbon 
technologies by 2015. Other major initiatives for low carbon technological RD&D include the Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum, the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy, and the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor.   12
advanced vehicle technologies—almost twice as much as on the second most sizeable 
area, CCS.  
According to the IEA (2009b) advanced vehicle technology RD&D is particularly 
focused at the development of plug-in vehicles, hybrid-electric vehicles, lightweight 
materials, energy storage systems, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, and low rolling 
resistance tires. These can be seen as energy-saving technologies. 
The second largest category in terms of RD&D spending is on CCS. According to the 
IEA (2009b) here most research is focusing on direct capture of CO2 from the air, on 
development of CO2 storage facilities, on CO2 pipeline transport, and on using CO2 in 
enhanced oil recovery methods and cement production. This is followed by RD&D 
expenditure on solar energy with the USA, Italy, and Germany leading the field. Most 
solar energy applications aim at providing electricity through photovoltaic or 
concentrated solar power (IEA 2009b). Solar energy is seen by many to provide 
particular opportunities for green growth to developing countries, particularly those in 
Africa. 
IP for innovation-driven low-carbon industrialization will, in addition to carbon pricing, 
and subsidized RD&D also have to deal with carbon leakage. Carbon leakage refers to 
the practice whereby firms and factories can migrate to countries where carbon prices 
are lower. To deal with carbon leakage will require IP, but also trade policy and an 
alignment of trade and IPs. This is discussed again in detail below in Section 3.5. For 
now, it may be mentioned that IP may deal with carbon leakage through industry-level 
agreements on the global scale—hence again requiring coordination IP. In this regard 
sector approaches, agreements and mechanisms have been called on to support low-
carbon industrialization. These would entail sector-level agreements—for instance in 
the steel industry—to move towards particular emission standards, work towards 
adopting and spreading the best available technologies in this regard, and police the 
agreement (Wooders 2010; Prins et al. 2010). 
3.4  Aligning industrial policy with trade 
IPs to foster a low-carbon economy will have important repercussions for trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI)—and hence trade policies. Hence a paper on IP and 
climate change cannot omit a discussion of the foremost trade issues that may arise. 
Note, however, that a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between climate 
change and trade falls outside the scope of this paper—the interested reader is referred 
to Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim (2009) for a recent overview.  
One of the central global issues that has spilled over from the industrial low-carbon 
debate onto the trade arena, is related to concerns about ‘carbon leakage’, as was 
already mentioned in Section 3.3.3. The fear is that regions that take the lead in moving 
to a low-carbon industrial base could become competitively disadvantaged. Some have 
even added to this the fear that the overall impact of such carbon leakages could be that 
global emissions increase, as it may create huge incentives for carbon-production in 
other regions (Helm 2009). UNCTAD (2010:36) stresses the incentive this would create 
for many developing countries, stating that ‘for poor countries in dire need of expanding 
their productive capacities such foreign investment could potentially generate large 
development gains’.   13
In the absence of globally binding agreements on low-carbon regulations and a global 
price of carbon, two alternative mechanisms have been mooted to deal with this 
potential problem. The one is border tax adjustments (BTAs)—tariffs on the carbon 
content of imported goods. The other is the development of emission trading schemes 
requiring importers to buy emission rights domestically to offset imported emissions. 
BTAs currently appear to be the most favoured approach, at least politically. It boils 
down to getting industrial and trade policies consistent. But can it be effective? While 
there are proponents, a growing number of economists have in recent times cast doubt 
about the desirability and feasibility of BTAs. 
Dong and Whalley (2008) discuss some of the difficulties with using BTAs to affect 
emissions. First, they note that it is growth rather than trade that is the major contributor 
to emissions. Second, emissions differ more substantially between countries than 
products, posing the problem of whether trade policy should discriminate against 
products, or countries—and conflict with the non-discrimination clauses of the WTO. 
Third, WTO-based tariff measures are likely to have a small impact on emissions 
because most are in a small number of sectors where output is not directly traded, such 
as electricity generation and transport. Fourth, it is difficult to define and agree on what 
could be regarded as ‘environmentally sensitive’ goods and services to treat separately 
in trade. Moreover as UNCTAD (2010) also indicates, it is difficult to measure or agree 
to measure the carbon-intensity of individual goods. Fifth, the administration of BTAs 
based on the carbon-content of imports will be a very costly process and difficult to 
implement. Finally, Dong and Whalley (2008) also point to the danger that once BTAs 
are used that government may want to engage in further ‘strategic’ trade policies to try 
and offset other perceived sources of competitive disadvantage, which could herald a 
new era of retreating from freer global trade to protectionism. In other words BTAs 
could be misused for protectionism—or ‘old’ IPs.  
Hence, in the context of climate change IPs should guard against being usurped by 
strategic trade policies due to misuse of BTA. Careful alignment with trade is needed; 
moreover, the pitfall yet again emphasizes the importance of globally coordinated IPs. 
3.5  Funding industrial policies for a low-carbon economy 
There is recognition that all of the above will require huge amounts of investment—by 
both private and public sector. Financial resources would need to be made available for 
developing countries. From whom and how such funds should be channeled, remain 
largely unresolved global questions. Proposals include the reform of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the establishment of international funding pools. 
More FDI into low-carbon projects in developing countries are needed (UNCTAD 
2010).  
At COP15 member states agreed (as part of the Copenhagen Accord) to create a funding 
mechanism to support mitigation of climate change in developing countries. It has 
subsequently been estimated that in order to achieve the targets in GHG reductions 
contained in the Copenhagen Accord, that at least US$440 billion in additional annual 
investment will be needed between 2010 and 2015, and that this would rise to US$1.2 
trillion per year by 2030 (Creamer 2010). Other estimates of the investment required for 
climate change mitigation has come from the IEA. According to the IEA (2009a) in 
order to limit CO2 levels to 450 ppm by 2030 will require additional investment in   14
energy infrastructure and capital to the amount of US$10.5 trillion. Half of this would 
be in transport and around US$1.5 trillion would be specifically needed in industrial and 
bio-fuels (second-generation) production. Developing countries are estimated to require 
around US$197 billion in extra investment by 2020 (IEA 2009a).  
For developing countries international transfers will be a key source of funding a low-
carbon economy, as well as for adaptation. However, taxation of CO2—broadening the 
resource base and providing incentives for switching from carbon at the same will also 
be important. And developing countries seem to be taking such taxes seriously—e.g. 
South Africa introduced in 2010 a carbon tax on vehicles (Van der Merwe 2010a, 
2010b).  
Generally though, especially coming after the financial crisis, many developing (and 
advanced) countries will find it hard to scrape together substantial funds for supporting 
mitigation efforts and particularly low-carbon industrialization. Here the entrepreneurial 
perspective comes into play again. As UNCTAD (2010: 24) stress ‘the financial 
contribution of the private sector is essential for achieving progress in making 
economies worldwide more climate-friendly, particularly in view of the huge public 
deficits worldwide’. 
These will need on a global level to be supported by much more FDI into low-carbon 
production in developing countries. Such FDI is seen as an important channel for 
transferring knowledge about low-carbon technology and for limiting carbon leakage 
(UNCTAD 2010) According to UNCTAD (2010) the estimated FDI in 2009 into 
renewable, recycling, and low-carbon manufacturing was around US$90 billion, with 
around 40 per cent of this going to developing countries. Private funding will thus be an 
important source of funds for mitigating climate change in developing counties. There 
are some encouraging signs of such funding already emerging in SSA. For instance 
private investors have established, at the time of writing, at least two funds for 
developing and rolling out low-carbon technologies on the continent, including a 
technology development fund and a technology deployment fund (Van der Merwe 
2010b). With aid to developing countries shrinking, and aid perhaps being diverted to 
climate change funds, and in view of the many practical difficulties in operationalizing 
the planned global funds for addressing climate change, the need for IP to engage with 
the private sector, and elicit private funding, is likely to be crucial in getting low-carbon 
industrialization efforts financially supported. 
4 Concluding  remarks 
More than fifty years ago Raul Prebisch pointed out that ‘industrialization of the 
periphery has always been a controversial subject, not only in the centers, but also in the 
peripheral countries themselves’ (Prebisch 1959: 251). Given rising global inequalities, 
the failure of industrialization in the poorest countries, particularly in SSA, and given 
the challenges of climate change, the industrialization of the periphery will undoubtedly 
become an even more controversial subject in times to come.  
This paper started out by pointing to industry as a major emitter of GHG—contributing 
to global climate change. It is also a major driver of economic growth and development. 
The benefits of industrialization are sorely needed in a very unequal world where more 
than a billion people still live in absolute poverty. But in light of the likely economic   15
impact of climate change, industrialization needs to take place so that it mitigates 
climate change and facilitates adaptation. 
Industrialization in the coming decades will face clear costs and benefits. This paper 
made the case why selected policies needed to deal with such industrialization in the 
midst of the climate change challenge. The costs implied by climate change will be 
incurred because countries’ entrepreneurs need to shift their firm onto a different 
production technology frontier—changing the way goods are produced. Investment in 
new techniques processes as well as shifts to lower carbon energy sources are required. 
These all imply costs, and hence the guidance of IPs to minimize costs. Carbon itself 
will have to be priced, and will have to become gradually more expensive. This will 
result in more costly production, at least over the medium term.  
But a transition to a lower carbon industrialization process also offers benefits and 
opportunities. These include opportunities for producing low-carbon products. Many 
developing countries could benefit from this green growth, if they could marshal the 
adequate and timely responses through IPs. These could also generate substantial 
savings in the cost of using fossil fuels, if successful. In addition to these direct benefits, 
achieving a sustainable low-carbon industrialization path would result in indirect 
spillover benefits such as a cleaner environment and health improvements.  
There are many pitfalls in applying IP. From past debates about IP most of these are 
known—they revolve around the imperfect information possessed by governments and 
the potential for IPs to be captured by special interest groups. Such potential 
government failures remain important to avoid. In the context of climate change 
however, perhaps the most important prerequisite for avoiding pitfalls is that IPs need 
greater international coordination and cooperation than ever before. This has been the 
central argument of this paper. Achieving such international coordination is perhaps, 
given the possible adverse impacts of climate change, one of the greatest challenges 
facing global development. This paper noticed a number of stumbling blocks, including 
the fact that developing and advanced economies face different objectives and 
challenges in low-carbon industrialization. For developing countries, job creation and 
the extension of energy to their populations are key issues; for advanced economies it is 
job creation and energy security. IPs for low-carbon industrialization need to be 
designed and coordinated around these imperatives. 
The most likely path forward for low-carbon industrialization that will be consistent 
with the needs of human development may be one supported that makes use of nuclear 
power, that also uses coal, but that uses CSS technologies as far as possible to reduce 
carbon in the atmosphere. These need to be accompanied by a diversification into 
renewable energy sources over the medium to longer term. Hence IPs needs to have 
different short- and long-term goals. Cooperation between the big emerging powers, 
China and India on the one hand, and the USA and EU on the other in reducing carbon 
emission would afford ILCs some leeway to achieve growth from cheaper supplies of 
coal, while moving at an appropriate tempo to a carbon-free economy. Of course, this 
leeway should be supported by the large emerging powers and advanced countries by 
transfers of technology and climate funding.  
For SSA, and large parts of Latin America, the fundamental challenge is not to make a 
short- or medium-term contribution to the mitigation of global warming, but to adapt 
industrialization to the consequences of global warming. In SSA industrial development   16
can as such not be divorced from agriculture. More research is needed to draw out the 
implications for IPs in Africa where the base will be agriculture. The latter, the source 
of livelihoods to a majority of the population, will according to most estimates be 
severely affected by global warming. Hence the best response in Africa could be to 
promote job-intensive growth, the rolling out of social security nets, the encouragement 
of entrepreneurship—in other words generally increase the resilience of the population 
to adapt to climate changes and climate shocks. For this, socio-political stability and 
continued improvements in governance will be required from African governments. 
Advanced countries should support and rewards such improvements, inter alia by 
coordination of their own policies (such as scrapping expensive subsidies for farmers in 
advanced economies) with that of developing countries. Ultimately what will be 
required if the climate change challenge is to be credibly shouldered, is that 
international coordination of IPs will lead to a change in the nature of development 
cooperation—moving it from donor-driven aid towards partnerships. Partnerships that 
are consistent with local needs, conditions, and abilities, and that give developing 
country policy makers, through their IPs, a driving-seat role in their countries’ 
development. 
References 
Altenburg, T. (2009). ‘Industrial Policy for Low and Lower-Middle Income Countries’. 
Paper presented at the UNU-WIDER, UNU-MERIT, and UNIDO Workshop on 
‘Pathways to Industrialization in the 21st Century: New Challenges and Emerging 
Paradigms’, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 22–23 October. 
Barrett, S. (2009). ‘The Coming Global Climate-Technology Revolution’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23 (2): 53–75. 
Bondre, N. (2010). ‘Whence Climate Skepticism?, Global Change, 75:16–19. 
Brandt, U. S., and G. T. Svendsen (2003). ‘Fighting Windmills? EU Industrial Interest 
and Global Climate Negotiations’. IME Working Paper 37/03. University of 
Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. 
Creamer, T. (2010). ‘Yearly Green Investments of $440bn Needed to Meet Climate 
Target’, Engineering News, 23 July. 
Dong, Y., and J. Whalley (2008). ‘Carbon, Trade Policy, and Carbon Free Trade Areas’. 
Trade Working Paper 1847. East Asian Bureau of Economic Research. 
Frankhauser, S. (1995). Valuing Climate Change: The Economics of the Greenhouse. 
London: Earthscan. 
Girod, B., A. Wiek, H. Mieg, and M. Hulme (2009). ‘The Evolution of the IPCC’s 
Emission Scenarios’, Environmental Science Policy, 12 (2): 103–18. 
Helm, D. (2009). ‘EU Climate-Change Policy—A Critique’. In D. Helm and C. 
Hepburn (eds), The Economics and Politics of Climate Change. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hope, C.W. (2006). ‘The Marginal Impact of CO2 from PAGE2002. An Integrated 
Assessment Model Incorporating IPCC’s Five Reasons for Concern’, Integrated 
Assessment Journal, 6 (1): 19–56.   17
Hufbauer, G. C., S. Charnovitz, and J. Kim (2009). Global Warming and the World 
Trading System. Washington DC: Peterson Institute. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2009a). World Energy Outlook 2009. Paris: IEA. 
—— (2009b). Global Gaps in Clean Energy Research, Development and 
Demonstration. Paris: IEA. 
Maddison, D. J. (2003). ‘The Amenity Value of the Climate: The Household Production 
Function Approach’, Resource and Energy Economics, 25 (2): 155–75. 
Martin, P. (2010). ‘Climate Change, Agricultural Development, and Migration’. GMF 
Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration. Washington DC. 
Mendelsohn, R. D, M. E. Schlesinger, and L. J. Williams (2000). ‘Comparing Impacts 
across Climate Models’, Integrated Assessment, 1 (1): 37–48. 
Naudé, W. A., and L. Alcorta (2010). ‘Industrial Policy and Environmental 
Sustainability: The Challenge after COP15’. WIDER Angle January 2010, available 
at: wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles-2010/en_GB/01-2010-wider-angle/ 
Nordhaus, W. D. (2007). ‘A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45 (3): 686–702. 
Nordhaus, W. D., and Z. Yang (1996). ‘RICE: A Regional Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Model of Optimal Climate Change Policy’, American Economic Review, 
86 (4): 741–65. 
Ojha, V. P. (2008). ‘Carbon Emissions Reduction Strategies and Poverty Alleviation in 
India’, Environment and Development Economics, 14: 323–48. 
Plambeck, E. L., and C. W. Hope (1996). ‘PAGE95—An Updated Valuation of the 
Impacts of Global Warming’, Energy Policy, 24 (9): 783–93. 
Prebisch, R. (1959). ‘Commercial Policy in Underdeveloped Countries’, American 
Economic Review, 49 (2): 251–73. 
Prins, G., I. Galiana, C. Green, R. Grundmann, A. Korhola, F. Laird, T. Nordhaus, R. 
Pielke S. Rayner, D. Sarewitz, M. Shellenberger, N. Stehr, and H. Tezuko (2010). 
‘The Hartwell Paper: A New Direction for Climate Policy after the Crash of 2009’. 
London/Oxford: University of Oxford and London School of Economics. Available 
at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/mackinderProgramme/theHartwellPaper/ (accessed 6 
August 2010).  
Schelling, T. (2009). ‘International Coordination to Address the Climate Challenge’, 
Innovations, 13–21. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1911). The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press (1934 translated by R. Opie). 
Stern, N. (2006). The Economics of Climate Change (The Stern Report). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Szirmai, A. (2009). ‘Industrialization and an Engine of Growth in Developing 
Countries, 1950–2005’, Paper presented at the UNU-WIDER, UNU-MERIT and 
UNIDO Workshop on ‘Pathways to Industrialization in the 21st Century: New 
Challenges and Emerging Paradigms’, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 22–23 October.   18
Tol, R. S. J. (2002a). ‘Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change—Part I: 
Benchmark Estimates’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 21 (1): 47–73. 
—— (2002b). ‘Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change—Part II: Dynamic 
Estimates’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 21 (2): 135–60. 
—— (2010). ‘The Economic Effects of Climate Change’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 23 (2): 29–51.  
Tol, R. S. J., and G. Yohe (2006). ‘A Review of the Stern Review’, World Economics, 7 
(4): 233–50. 
Trudeau, N., and C. Tam (2009). ‘Energy Technology Perspectives Transition for 
Industry’ Presentation. Paris: IEA. 
UNCTAD (2010). World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low carbon Economy. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
Van der Merwe, C. (2010a). ‘SA Business Should Investigate Carbon Tax 
Implications’, Engineering News, 20 July. 
—— (2010b). ‘Private Investors Make $ 200m available for Clean Energy Projects’, 
Engineering News, 19 July. 
Wooders, P. (2010). ‘International Sectoral Approaches and Agreements: Case Studies 
of the Steel Sector in China, India and Japan—Policy Recommendations’, Climate 
Strategies, July 27th. Available at www.climatestrategies.org/  
World Bank (2010). World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate 
Change. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
    19
Table 1: The global economic impact of climate change—estimates from the literature 





Best off region 
Frankhauser (1995)  -1.4%  China  Eastern Europe 
and former 
Soviet Union 
Tol (1995)  -1.9%  Africa  Eastern Europe 
and former 
Soviet Union 




Plambeck and Hope (1996)  -0.5% to -
11.4% 
Asia Eastern  Europe 
and former 
Soviet Union 
Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, and Williams 
(2000) 
0.0 % to 0.1%  Africa  Eastern Europe 
and former 
Soviet Union 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)  -1.5%  Africa  Russia 
Tol (2002)*  2.3%  Africa  Western Europe 
Maddison (2003)  -0.1%  South America  Western Europe 
Rehdanz and Maddison (2005)  -0.4%  Africa  South Asia 
Hope (2006)  0.9%  Asia  Eastern Europe 
and former 
Soviet Union 
Note: * Assumes a 1 ⁰C warming only. 
Source: Adapted from Tol (2010: 31). 
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Table 2: Estimated RD&D expenditure on low-carbon industrialization in selected countries, 


















USA 539.4  287.6  594.0  85.4  79.9  217.2  60.2  190.3  31.7 
Japan  319.6  18.7  36.8 139.0 143.9  78.9  94.4 1.0  1.9 
Australia 189.9  6.9  123.5 22.7  26.4  100.2  20.8  39.0  5.7 
France  135.8  40.2  38.8 32.8  16.7    12.2 47.9  2.5 
EC  94.0  19.2  31.9 -  -  43.0  18.9 44.4  15.9 
Korea  73.4  4.7  12.2 8.0  81.9  16.9  27.7 58.3  18.4 
Italy  62.9  17.5  11.7 83.3  13.2  16.1  90.6 93.6  4.4 
Germany  57.4  34.7 8.3  31.6  11.0  47.2  57.4  79.0 49.9 
Canada 36.1  43.2  19.0 19.2  12.6  17.1  12.2 13.6  8.3 
UK  19.0  24.8 6.5  8.2  1.8  2.0  15.6  40.0 30.9 
Russia 15.2  14.5 0.9  22.6  23.4  5.0  9.6 6.9   
Brazil    62.8             
India    10.5          20.6  4.3 
China    5.1          29.3  11.7 
Totals  1542.7  590.4  883.6 452.8  410.8  543.6  419.6 663.9  185.6 
Source: Compiled from IEA data (2009b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 